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Abstract. Some finite and symmetric two-player games have no (pure or
mixed) symmetric Nash equilibrium when played by partly morally motivated
players. The reason is that the "right thing to do" may be not to randomize.
We analyze this issue both under complete information between equally moral
players and under incomplete information between arbitrarily moral players.
We provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of equilibrium
and illustrate the results with examples and counter-examples.
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1. Introduction
In economics and non-cooperative game theory, economic agents and players are
usually assumed to be pure consequentialists, that is, to evaluate their alternative
courses of action (consumption or production plans, strategies) exclusively in terms
of the consequence for themselves and perhaps also for others. However, people may
to some extent also be driven by deontological motivations, such as a wish to "do the
right thing" in the given situation. Such a partly morally motivated participant in a
public goods game may, for example, contribute the amount that would maximize the
group’s welfare if everybody would do likewise. An individual who acts accordingly,
even when expecting others not to follow suit, is not necessarily irrational, or prey to
"magical thinking". Such a person may simply have a goal function that gives some
weight to Immanuel Kant’s (1785) categorical imperative, to “act only on the maxim
that you would at the same time will to be a universal law”.
In standard public goods games such partly morally motivated individuals may
be behaviorally indistinguishable from altruists, individuals who are pure consequen-
tialists but who attach a positive value to other’s well-being. However, in other
∗Department of Statistics & Operations Research (ISOR)/Vienna Center of Operations Research
(VCOR) & Research Platform Data Science (ds:UniVie), University of Vienna.
†Department of Statistics & Operations Research (ISOR), University of Vienna.
‡Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, and Institute for Advanced Study
in Toulouse (IAST).
1
DOES MORAL PLAY EQUILIBRATE? 2
interactions, a Kantian moralist may behave quite diﬀerently from an altruist. Take
a 2× 2 coordination game, where both players obtain payoﬀ 1 if both use their first
pure strategy, 2 if both use their second pure strategy, and otherwise zero. An al-
truist who expects the opponent to play the first pure strategy will do likewise. By
contrast, a Kantian moralist may instead use the second pure strategy. This will
result in material payoﬀ zero to both, but the moralist may obtain psychological
utility from behaving in a way he wishes all would in such interactions. If two stern
moralists would play the coordination game, they would do just fine. However, in
some games moralists of intermediate degree, known by both, may not even have a
Nash equilibrium, and this may also be the case when player’s degree of morality is
their private information.
We here explore exactly these questions, more precisely whether symmetric Nash
equilibria exist in symmetric and finite games played by partly morally motivated
players. As a formal representation of such players we use the Homo moralis prefer-
ences that Alger and Weibull (2013) showed are evolutionarily stable in populations
under assortative random matching.1 We establish the existence of symmetric Nash
equilibria for certain game classes, when played by such players, and we also give
examples of simple games with no such equilibria. Our main results, Theorems 1 and
2, establish necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of symmetric Nash
equilibrium between partly morally motivated players under incomplete information
about others’ degree of morality.
2. Definitions and preliminaries
In this note we consider finite and symmetric games. Let  = {1 } be the set
of pure strategies, and let ∆ be the associated unit simplex of mixed strategies,
∆ =
(
 ∈ R+ :  =
X
=1
 = 1
)

Here  = P=1 , where  is the :th unity (column) vector, and the superscript 
denotes transpose. We write  for the zero vector (origin).
Let  be an ×-matrix with "material" payoﬀs, let  ∈ [0 1] be a player type,
and consider the associated payoﬀ function  : ∆2 → R, defined by
 ( ) = (1− ) +  ·  (1)
where  and  are (column) vectors in∆. The parameter  is the degree of morality of
Homo moralis, with  = 0 representing pure self-interest, or Homo oeconomicus, and
1The idea that moral values may have been formed by evolutionary forces can be traced back
to at least Darwin (1871). More recent informal treatments include, to mention a few, Alexander
(1987) and de Waal (2006).
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 = 1 representing pure (Kantian) morality, or Homo kantiensis (Alger and Weibull,
2013). Thus  ( ) is the payoﬀ (or utility) to a player with degree of morality 
when using strategy  against an opponent using strategy  in a symmetric game
with (material) payoﬀ matrix . Both player positions have the same set  of pure
strategies,  is the matrix of material payoﬀs to the row player, and  =  of those
to the column player.
For a given matrix  and degree of morality  ∈ [0 1], let  : ∆ ⇒ ∆ be the
best-reply correspondence of Homo moralis of degree :
 () = argmax∈∆  ( ) ∀ ∈ ∆ 
Hence, a rational player with Homo moralis preferences of type  will use some
strategy  in the subset  () if expecting the other player to use mixed strategy ∈ ∆. By Weierstrass’ maximum theorem,  () is a non-empty and compact set
for every  ∈ [0 1] and  ∈ ∆. However, as will be seen shortly, this set is not always
convex. We will study the existence and nature of fixed points under , that is points ∈ ∆ such that  ∈  (). These are then the symmetric Nash equilibria when two
Homines morales of the same degree of morality meet.
By Berge’s maximum theorem,  is upper hemi-continuous. For  = 0 the
correspondence 0 is convex-valued. In fact, all its values are then sub-simplices,
non-empty subsets of ∆ spanned by finitely many vertices. This is the standard
setting of non-cooperative game theory, and as is well known, there exists at least
one fixed point whenever  = 0.
3. Games between equally moral players
The analysis in this section generalizes results for symmetric 2×2 games in Section 4
of Alger and Weibull (2013). We here consider strategic interactions under complete
information between two equally moral players who play a symmetric  × game
in material payoﬀs, for any  ∈ N. We begin by a 2×2 example that illustrates that
the correspondence  need not be convex-valued for positive degrees of morality.
Example 1. Consider
 =
µ  0
0 
¶
for    0. For  = 0, there are three fixed points; the two unit vectors, 1 and 2,
and the mixed strategy
∗ =
µ  (+ )
 (+ )
¶

Note that  = 21 + 22 for all  ∈ R2. Hence, this term is strictly convex in 
and so is ( ), for any given   0 and  ∈ ∆. Therefore, () ⊆ {1 2}. It is
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immediate that 1 ∈ (1) iﬀ  ≥ , and 2 ∈ (2) iﬀ  ≥ . So both 1 and 2
are fixed points for 0 ≤  ≤ 0 := min{ }, and there is only one fixed point for
every   0. For  = 0, one of (1) and (2) is a binary set. For all other values
of , both (1) and (2) are singletons. Next observe that for arbitrary   0,(∗) ⊆ {1 2} is a singleton when  6= , but (∗) = {1 2}, a non-convex set,
if  = .
Since  =  is the payoﬀ matrix of the column player,
 () =  ¡+¢ = 2
is welfare, defined as the sum of the two players’ material payoﬀs when both use
strategy  ∈ ∆. This defines the welfare function  : ∆ → R. Accordingly, the
payoﬀ function of a Homo moralis with degree of morality  can be written in the
form
 ( ) = (1− ) + 
2
· () 
Hence, if  is concave, then  ( ) is concave in  ∈ ∆, for every  ∈ ∆, so
existence of Nash equilibrium then follows immediately from Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem.
Proposition 1. The set of fixed points is non-empty and compact if  = 0. The
same is true for every   0 if  is concave.
We note beforehand that a suﬃcient condition for  to be concave is that the
symmetric matrix  +  is negative-semidefinite. See Proposition 4 below for a
more general result.
Example 2. The payoﬀ matrix
 =
µ
0 
 0
¶
for    0 makes +  indefinite:  ¡+¢ = 2(+ )12 for any  ∈ R2.
However,  is concave on ∆: there  () = 2 (+ )1(1− 1). Hence, there exists
at least one fixed point. From strict concavity of  we know that the sets () are
singletons for all  ∈ ∆ and   0. Using first-order conditions, expressed in 1 only
(with 2 = 1− 1), we conclude
1 ∈ () ⇐⇒ 1  ( )|=1 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒  ∈ ∆1 
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where ∆1 = { ∈ ∆ : (1− ) [− (+ )1] ≥ (+ )}, and likewise
2 ∈ () ⇐⇒ 1  ( )|=2 ≤ 0 ⇐⇒  ∈ ∆2 
where ∆2 = { ∈ ∆ : (1 − ) [− (+ )1] ≤ −( + )}. Finally, for all  ∈
∆ \ (∆1 ∪∆2), we have () = {}, where
1 = 1
2
+
1− 
2
− (+ )1
+  ∈ (0 1)  (2)
Since 1 6∈ ∆1 and 2 6∈ ∆2 for all  ∈ [0 1], neither 1 nor 2 can be fixed points for
any . All fixed points (and we know at least one exists) are thus found by solving
1 = 1 with 1 given by the necessary first-order condition (2). This leads to exactly
one fixed point for every  ∈ (0 1], namely
 =
µ + 
(1 + )(+ ) 
+ 
(1 + )(+ )
¶
In particular, 1 = (+ ) and 2 = ( + ) define the unique fixed point when
 = 0.
A game-theoretically important class of games in which  +  is negative-
semidefinite are all constant-sum games (then + is the a matrix with identical
entries), with zero-sum games as the most prominent special case.
Proposition 2. Let  be the payoﬀ matrix of a symmetric constant-sum game. For
any   1, the set of fixed points is identical with the non-empty set of fixed points
when  = 0, while every  ∈ ∆ is a fixed point when  = 1.
In other words, all Homines morales, except Homo kantiensis, behave like Homo
oeconomicus in all (finite and symmetric two-player) constant-sum games.
The remaining situation to investigate is thus when   0 and  is not concave.
We begin with an example.
Example 3. Consider the generalized Rock-Scissors-Paper (RSP) game matrix
 =
³
1 2+ 0
0 1 2+
2+ 0 1
´
for any   −1. We note that this is a constant-sum game if and only if  = 0.
For  = 0, the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy is the barycenter . As
is well-known, this unique equilibrium is unstable in the replicator dynamic for all
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  0 and asymptotically stable for all   0.2 The function  is strictly concave if
  0 and strictly convex if   0, because for any  ∈ ∆:
 () = 2 +  · ¡1− kk2¢ 
Henceforth, assume   0, fix 0    1 and observe that ∅ 6= () ⊆ {1 2 3}
for all  ∈ ∆. Moreover, ( ) = 1 for all  ∈  while
(1 2) = (2 3) = (3 1) = (1− ) (2 + ) +  
Hence, (1 2)  ( ) iﬀ (1− ) (1 + )  0, so for −1    0, no vertex
 is a fixed point for any  ∈ (0 1). Consequently, there exist no fixed point for
0    1 in generalized RSP-games with values of  in this interval. In other words,
if this game is played by two Homines morales of intermediate degree of morality,
then there exists no pure or mixed strategy  that they could both play and thereby
obtain a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1 ensures existence of at least one fixed point if the welfare function
 is concave on ∆. If the welfare function instead is strictly convex, then fixed
points may not exist. The next result provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
existence in the latter case.
Proposition 3. If  is strictly convex on ∆, then () ⊆ {1  } for all  ∈ ∆
and   0, and  is a fixed point under  if and only if
 ≥  + (1− )  ∀ ∈  
Proof. If is strictly convex, so is ( ) in , and hence the first claim follows.
The second claim is then obvious from ( ) =  + (1− ) .
The usefulness of both Propositions 1 and 3 depends on how easy or hard it is
to verify that the welfare function is either concave or strictly convex on the unit
simplex. Here are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for each of these properties.
Proposition 4. Let  be the expansion of the (− 1)× (− 1) identity matrix to
an (− 1) ×-matrix obtained by appending the column (−1    −1) ∈ R−1.
Then  is concave (strictly convex) over ∆ if and only if the symmetric (− 1) ×
(− 1) matrix
 = (+ )
is negative-semidefinite (positive-definite).
2See e.g. Section 3.1.5 in Weibull (1995), and references therein, and see also Benaïm, Hofbauer
and Hopkins (2009) for a classification of finite symmetric games into "stable" and "unstable" games.
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Proof. First observe that for any 0    1 and any two { } ⊂ ∆, we have
 () + (1− ) ()− (+ (1− )) = 2(1− )
with  = −  ⊥ . Writing  = (1     −1) ∈ R−1, we have for  ∈ ⊥ ⊂ R
that  = , and  6=  if and only if  6= . Hence 2 = , and the result
follows.
In some applications the payoﬀ matrix  is symmetric;  = . In such potential
or partnership (or doubly symmetric) games, it is well-known that average payoﬀ
increases along all solution trajectories to the replicator dynamic (see e.g. Section
3.6 in Weibull, 1995). For such games and any positive degree of morality, any
global welfare maximizer is a fixed point, and every fixed point is a local maximizer.
Formally:
Proposition 5. Suppose  = , and let   0. Then
(a)  ∈ argmax∈∆  () =⇒  ∈  (),
(b)  ∈  () =⇒  ∈ arg max∈∆∩ () for some neighborhood  of 
Proof. Define  : ∆ → R by () = ( ). If  ∈ argmax∈∆  () then () ≥  () for all  ∈ ∆, and the directional derivative of  in the direction of
− , evaluated at , is not positive,
4(− ) ≤ 0 for all  ∈ ∆ 
implying  ≤ , and therefore ( ) ≤ ( ) for all  ∈ ∆, i.e.,  ∈ ().
Next assume  ∈ (). Then  is a global maximizer of  over ∆. In particular
the directional derivative of  in the direction of −, evaluated at , is not positive,
(1 + )(− ) ≤ 0 for all  ∈ ∆ 
In case that (− ) = 0 for some , also the second directional derivative of 
in the direction of − , evaluated at , is not positive,
2(− )(− ) ≤ 0 for all  ∈ ∆ such that (− ) = 0 
Now the two displayed inequalities are suﬃcient for  to be a local maximizer of  ,
as those inequalities are also statements about first and second directional derivatives
of  .
In case of symmetric  there may indeed be fixed points  ∈ () that are local,
but not global, maximizers of  subject to  ∈ ∆. This happens in Example 1
for small  ≥ 0. If  is not symmetric, neither (a) nor (b) needs to hold. Example 3
shows that (a) can be violated, and violation of both (a) and (b) for 0 ≤   1 is
demonstrated by Example 2 when  6= .
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Remark 1. When applied to 2 × 2-games, the above analysis (in agreement with
Alger and Weibull, 2013) establishes that at least one symmetric Nash equilibrium
always exist between equally moral players.
4. Incomplete information about others’ morality
We now consider strategic interactions between two Homines morales who only know
their own degree of morality, not that of the opponent. We will call an individual’s
degree of morality the individual’s type and use the canonical notation Θ = [0 1]
for the type space. We endow Θ with its Euclidean topology and let  be a Borel
probability measure on Θ, representing the type distribution in the population from
which the players are drawn independently at random3.
A strategy is a Borel-measurable function  : Θ → ∆, assigning to each type
 ∈ Θ a mixed strategy () ∈ ∆. A Nash equilibrium under incomplete information
is a strategy  that is a best reply to itself. A strategy  is optimal against a mixed
strategy  ∈ ∆ if
 () ∈ argmax∈∆  ( ) ∀ ∈ Θ.
It follows from standard measurable-selection theory à la Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski
(see e.g. 18.3 and 18.4 in Aliprantis and Border, 2006, or 14.29 and 14.37 in Rock-
afellar and Wets, 2009) that such an optimal strategy  : Θ → ∆ exists for each
 ∈ ∆. A strategy  : Θ → ∆ is a best reply to itself, or constitutes a symmetric
Nash equilibrium, if the following condition holds for all  ∈ Θ:
 () ∈ argmax∈∆
Z
Θ
 ( ())  ()  (3)
By linearity of the payoﬀ function with respect to ,Z
Θ
 ( ())  () =  ¡ ¯¢
where
¯ = E [ ()] =
Z
Θ
() () 
is the representative agent ’s mixed strategy. In other words, in order to be a best
reply to itself, a strategy  : Θ→ ∆ has to be optimal against its own representative
agent’s mixed strategy.
Existence is non-trivial. However one may characterize Nash equilibrium by way
of first- and second-order optimality conditions. In order to state these, for each type
3The analysis in the preceding section thus concerns the special case when  is a unit probability
mass on one type ;  = , see Subsection 4.1 below.
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 ∈ Θ let () =  · (+ ), the Hessian matrix of (· ), for any  ∈ ∆. For any
strategy  : Θ→ ∆, let
() =  · (+ ) () + (1− ) ·¯ 
This is the gradient of the payoﬀ ( ¯) with respect to  ∈ ∆, evaluated at  = ().
For each pure strategy  ∈ , let
() =  () + () − ()()
The matrix () is a symmetric rank-two update of the Hessian  (), using the
gradient () ∈ R and the :th unit vector  ∈ ∆. Finally, for any strategy , each
type  ∈ Θ and every pure strategy  ∈ , we define the following polyhedral cone
Γ() = { ∈ ⊥ : () − () ≥ 0 for all  ∈ }
where ⊥ ⊂ R is the (− 1)-dimensional tangent space of the unit simplex ∆ (that
is, all vectors orthogonal to  ∈ R).
The result to follow establishes that, given any type distribution , a strategy
 : Θ → ∆ constitutes a Nash equilibrium under incomplete information if and
only if three conditions are met: a first-order (Lagrangian) condition, a complemen-
tary slackness condition, and a second-order (curvature) condition. The reason why
a second-order condition is suﬃcient is that all types’ payoﬀ functions are linear-
quadratic in their own strategy choice (in the underlying game). To ease reading,
we split the result in two separate statements and provide a joint proof of them only
after stating both.
Theorem 1. For any Borel probability measure  on ∆, a strategy  : Θ → ∆ is a
best reply to itself if and only if there are Borel-measurable functions 0 : Θ → R
and  : Θ→ R+ for all  ∈  such that, for all pure strategies  and for all types :
[()()] + (1− )[¯] + 0() + () = 0  (4)
()() = 0  (5)
() ≥ 0 for all  ∈ Γ()  if ()  0  (6)
We say that a strategy  : Θ → ∆ is a better reply than  : Θ → ∆ for type 
with ()  0 if ( ()  ¯)  (() ¯).
Proposition 6. If (6) is violated for some pure strategy  and type , then there
exists a better reply for this type , namely, the strategy  : Θ→ ∆ that agrees with
 for all types  6=  but has
 () = ()− () ·  
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Proof. The assertions in Theorem 1 follow from (Bomze 2016, Thm.2.3), formu-
lated for minimizing the negative −(· ¯) there; note that as ∆ is compact, we can
ignore the index  = 0 dealing with unbounded feasible rays there. The case of ∆
has been dealt already in the previous papers (Bomze 1997a,1997b) where also the
arguments for Proposition 6 can be found.
We saw in Section 3 an example of a game that has no equilibrium for equally
moral players, irrespective of their common degree of morality, as long as it is positive.
In terms of the machinery in the present section, the observation can be recast as
the statement that this game has no Nash equilibrium under incomplete information
when the type distribution  places unit probability mass on some type   0. The
following subsection deals with this case by providing conditions which simplify those
of Theorem 1.
4.1. A homogeneous population. Suppose now that  places unit probability
on some  ∈ Θ. Applying the above general machinery, we search for a fixed point
of the best-reply correspondence , i.e. a strategy ¯ ∈ ∆ which coincides with both() and ¯ by virtue of the special nature of  = . We use the notation  for
a principal submatrix of  = []()∈× and of a subvector  of  ∈ R, both
referring to a (non-empty) index set  ⊆ :
 = []()∈× and  = []∈ 
We consider the × matrix
() := +  
in order to state the characterization for a homogeneous population:
Theorem 2. A point ¯ ∈ ∆ with support  = { : ¯  0} is a fixed point of the
correspondence  if and only if conditions (a)—(c) are satisfied for some  ∈ R:
(a) (¯ ) ∈ R+1 satisfies the linear equation system
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
()¯ −  = 
¯ = 0 for all  ∈  \ 
 ¯ = 1 
(b) (¯ ) ∈ R+1 satisfies the linear inequalities( − ()¯ ≥ 
¯ ≥ 0 for all  ∈  
(c) For all  ∈ , the matrix () is Γ()-copositive, i.e.,
() ≥ 0 for all  ∈ Γ() 
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Proof. We apply Theorem 1. First observe that () = ¯ = ¯ implies ()() +
(1 − )¯ = ()¯. Further, (5) implies () = 0 for all  ∈ , so that, with
 = −0(), we get via (4)
[()¯ ] = [()¯] = [()() + (1− )¯] =  for all  ∈  
Finally, condition (c) is exactly condition (6) in Theorem 1.
Note that by construction () = ()¯ ≤ 0 for all  ∈ Γ() and all  ∈ 
as  ≥ 0 holds for all  ∈  \ . Hence condition (c) is ensured if ( +  ) is
negative-semidefinite, as  ∈ Γ() implies also  ≤ 0 and since
() = 2( ()− ¯) 
On the other hand, already local optimality of ¯ for the function ( ¯) implies
for   0 that [ +  ] is negative-semidefinite on [ ]⊥, a linear subspace of co-
dimension one in R . This necessary condition can be viewed as a localized version
(relative to the face of the simplex that contains ¯ in its relative interior) of the
suﬃcient existence criterion in Proposition 1; see Proposition 4.
Remark 2. In Example 3 we noted that no symmetric Nash equilibrium exists under
complete information in a game between equally moral players when −1   
0 and 0    1. Formally, such a situation can be represented as incomplete
information with a Dirac measure placed on that particular type . Consider instead
any continuous type distribution  on Θ = [0 1]. We may then divide the type space
into three disjoint intervals  with () = 13, for  = 1 2 3. If all types in  play
pure strategy , then all types  ∈ Θ best respond to ¯ = , the barycenter of the
strategy simplex. Hence, the non-existence of symmetric equilibrium under complete
information and equally moral players may be non-robust to arbitrarily small degrees
of incomplete information about morality, as measured in the 1-norm.
Acknowledgments: We thank Erik Mohlin and Ron Peretz for helpful discus-
sions.
References
[1] Alexander, R. D. (1987): The Biology of Moral Systems. New York: Aldine De
Gruyter.
[2] Alger, I. and J. Weibull (2013): “Homo moralis–preference evolution under
incomplete information and assortative matching,” Econometrica 81, 2269-2302.
[3] Aliprantis, C.D. and K.C. Border (2006): Infinite dimensional analysis: a hitch-
hiker’s guide, 3rd ed. Berlin: Springer.
DOES MORAL PLAY EQUILIBRATE? 12
[4] Benaïm, M., J. Hofbauer and E. Hopkins (2009): “Learning in games with un-
stable equilibria”, Journal of Economic Theory 144, 1694-1709.
[5] Bomze, I.M. (1997a): “Evolution towards the maximum clique”, Journal of
Global Optimization 10, 143-164.
[6] Bomze, I.M. (1997b): “Global escape strategies for maximizing quadratic forms
over a simplex”, Journal of Global Optimization 11, 325-338.
[7] Bomze, I.M. (2016): “Copositivity for second-order optimality conditions in gen-
eral smooth optimization problems”, Optimization 65, 779-795.
[8] Darwin, C. (1871): The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. Lon-
don: John Murray.
[9] de Waal, F. B.M. (2006): Primates and Philosophers. How Morality Evolved.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[10] Kant, I. (1785): Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. [In English: Ground-
work of the Metaphysics of Morals. 1964. New York: Harper Torch books.]
[11] Rockafellar, R.T., and R.J.-B. Wets (2009): Variational analysis, 3rd printing.
Berlin: Springer.
[12] Weibull, J. (1995): Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press: Cambridge MA.
